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First of all, let me express my deep gratitude to the Elcano Royal Institute and to Madame 
de la Peña Corcuera, the Director for Africa at the Ministry of External Relations of Spain, 
represented here by her Deputy, for giving me this opportunity to engage with you on the 
challenges I, and other key international partners, face in supporting the authorities and 
people of Guinea-Bissau in their efforts to overcome recurrent instability and embark on 
the path to peace-building and economic development. 
 
But before addressing some of these challenges, and the issues at stake today when it 
comes to the situation in Guinea-Bissau, I would like to give you a brief historical 
background of the developments that brought Guinea-Bissau to where it stands today. 
 
Brief Historical Background 
Following a decade of instability triggered by the 1998-99 civil war, and despite repeated 
efforts by national and international partners in Guinea-Bissau throughout that decade to 
address the root causes of the instability, in particular the complex relationship between 
the civilian and military leadership, it was only recently, at the beginning of 2010, that 
tangible prospects for reversing the negative dynamics that had hampered the stability of 
the country and the sub-region became visible. 
 
The Government of Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior, which emerged from the 2008 
parliamentary elections, had managed within a short period of time to achieve tangible 
results in his efforts to place economic and fiscal reform at the core of his overall strategy 
for supporting economic recovery and reducing instability. For the first time in a decade, at 
the beginning of 2010, the Government of Guinea-Bissau was able to improve fiscal 
management and the payment of salaries in the administration. 
 
Meanwhile, a change of leadership in the armed forces and the assassinations of 
President Vieira and the Chief of General Staff of the armed forces, General Tagme, in 
March 2009 contributed to creating the conditions, albeit fragile, for addressing the 
sensitive civilian/military relationship and the increasing linkage between insubordination 
of the military and drug trafficking and organised crime. 
 
 
                                                 










By early 2010, progress made by the Government had generated a positive momentum 
among international partners, who had expressed their commitment to support the 
reforms in various sectors: the World Bank, the IMF and the African Development Bank 
had resumed and increased their programmes in Guinea-Bissau; The EU had contributed 
to devising the overall SSR framework for Guinea-Bissau; ECOWAS and the AU had 
demonstrated continued engagement to support political dialogue and SSR efforts; and 
the UN strengthened its presence in the country, with the deployment of UNIOGBIS (SCR 
1876 (2009)), to ‘deliver as one’ and assist the country in its peace-building efforts, with 
particular focus on the strengthening of State institutions, SSR, as well as the fight against 
drug trafficking and organised crime. 
 
The 1 April Events: A Turning Point for the International Community in Guinea-Bissau 
It is against the above background that the events of 1 April 2010 occurred. The brief 
arrest of the Prime Minister and the prolonged detention, since 1 April, of the Chief of 
General Staff of the armed forces not only constituted a serious breach of the 
constitutional order, but also underlined the fragility of key State institutions, due in part to 
the persistent insubordination of the military to the civilian leadership and the continuation 
of the negative practice of ‘shifting opportunistic alliances’. These events also illustrated 
the widespread impact of drug trafficking and organised crime and its links with the 
absence of civilian control over the armed forces. 
 
More importantly, these events demonstrated that despite the positive momentum and 
combined efforts by national and international partners to root out the causes and triggers 
of instability in Guinea-Bissau, the process was not irreversible and the weakness of State 
institutions deeper than anticipated. 
 
Drawing on these conclusions, the international community immediately adopted a 
common and firm position to condemn the breach of the constitutional order, urge the 
armed forces to remain subordinate to the civilian authorities and request the national 
authorities to urgently resume political dialogue and demonstrate their commitment to 
advancing the reform agenda under the leadership of the Government of Prime Minister 
Gomes Júnior. 
 
Since April, it is worth noting that the AU, ECOWAS, the EU, the UN and the CPLP 
continuously joined forces in that regard and have maintained that long-term engagement 
by international partners in Guinea-Bissau would be conditioned by the respect of the 
constitutional order, the designation of a credible leadership in the armed forces and 
immediate progress on the reform agenda, starting with SSR. 
 
As you are aware, as a result of the 1 April events, and acknowledging the lack of political 
will to advance the SSR in Guinea-Bissau, the EU Commission and Council decided to 
cease their operational support to the country’s authorities. This legitimate and 
understandable decision, however, left the other international partners with an important 
vacuum. The US took a similar decision following the appointment of the current Chief of 
Defence Staff, General Indjai, who was responsible for the 1 April events. 
 
At that point, the United Nations was faced with the delicate challenge of creating the 
conditions for trying to sustain the gains already made by national and international 
partners on some aspects of the reforms agenda and, at the same time, of avoiding 
having to compromise the unity among international partners and maintain pressure on 










In this context, it is worth stressing that the combination of pressure and disengagement 
by major partners has left the country, and the UN, with a narrow path and little options to 
implement the key tasks under SCR 1876 and SCR 1949, such as the SSR programme 
and the fight against drug trafficking. 
 
Current Priorities of the United Nations in Guinea-Bissau 
Allow me now to address the key priorities of UNIOGBIS, in line with its mandate, as 
given by the Security Council in its resolutions 1876 and 1949. The priorities for 
UNIOGBIS can be summarised under five areas, as follows: 
 
(1) To enhance the protection of State Institutions as a means to increase civilian 
authority and oversight over military structures and contribute to the stabilisation of the 
Institutions. With the departure of the EU-SSR Mission, the focus has been placed on 
mobilising CPLP and ECOWAS Member States to complement the internal capacities 
of UNIOGBIS to support the reform of the Police Sector, for which Spain directly 
contributed with two UNPOL, and to avoid losing momentum. However, despite the 
recent launch of Angola’s bilateral support to the rehabilitation of military and police 
installations and equipment, the core of the SSR support package is yet to be 
endorsed by the Heads of State of ECOWAS. 
 
(2) To contribute to the establishment of a genuinely inclusive political dialogue. The UN 
has been particularly involved for the past few months in maintaining and improving 
the dialogue between the President and the Prime Minister. This dialogue, that also 
involved the Speaker of the Parliament and the President of the Supreme Court, 
helped, in certain instances, make tremendous progress in resolving contentious 
issues. 
 
(3) To fight against impunity and strengthen the Rule of Law and democracy. The United 
Nations continued, through the past months, to insist on the importance of bringing to 
a close the investigations of the assassinations of 2009 without political interference 
as a step to consolidating State Institutions and increasing trust in the State. Similarly, 
the continued pressure by the UN, together with other partners such as the EU and 
the US, contributed to the release of the former Chief of Defence Staff Zamora Induta 
and his co-detainees on 22 December 2010. 
 
(4) To combat drug trafficking and organised crime in a more robust fashion. Guinea-
Bissau is one of the four pilot countries selected in the context of the West African 
Coast Initiative (WACI), that brings together ECOWAS, UNOWA, DPA, DPKO, 
UNODC. The recent establishment of a Transnational Crime Unit (TCU) in Guinea-
Bissau put the country at the forefront of implementation of the WACI. It is important to 
stress, however, that in order to root out this phenomenon that has corrupted all 
segments of society in Guinea-Bissau, in particular the armed forces, a more robust 
and concerted approach is needed from the international community. This approach 
should combine the establishment of mechanisms for monitoring the activities of 
organised crime networks, for enhancing the maritime surveillance of the islands and 
for creating intelligence sharing mechanisms within the region and beyond. Another 
positive development is the negotiations on the establishment of a MoU for Maritime 
Surveillance, under which vessels of partners will be allowed to patrol the territorial 
waters of Guinea-Bissau, along the lines of what is already done with Cape Verde and 










ministerial meeting on drug trafficking, which will bring together the countries of origin, 
transit and destination of drugs. 
 
(5) To coordinate the actions of international partners for their assistance in Security 
Sector Reform. This support is crucial for the benefit of other listed priorities. As 
indicated before, besides mobilising partners such as ECOWAS and CPLP, the 
priority of UNIOGBIS has also been to ensure that ties are maintained between the 
authorities and other partners. It is expected, in that regard, that the upcoming political 
consultations between the EU and the Government of Guinea-Bissau will produce 
tangible results, so as to enable the acceleration of financial and technical support for 
the reforms in Guinea-Bissau. However, it is worth noting that while partners talk 
about coordination, very few actually like being coordinated. 
 
The Way Forward 
After more than a decade of actively engaging with Guinea-Bissau, the international 
community should not, at this stage, condemn the country (and the sub-region) to a 
scenario of unpredictable consequences for its political stability, the application of rule of 
law and its socioeconomic development. The decision by Bretton Woods institutions, in 
December last year, to alleviate some US$1.2 billion of Guinea-Bissau’s external debt 
was a major positive step and should be welcomed by all Guinea-Bissau’s partners. 
 
It remains urgent for the UN and other key partners such as the EU, the AU, ECOWAS 
and the CPLP to continue to impress upon national stakeholders the need to: (a) create 
the conditions for a sustained and constructive dialogue between not only the President 
and the Prime Minister, but also the opposition, and other key State institutions; (b) 
address the weakness of the civilian leadership vis-à-vis the armed forces by 
strengthening civilian State institutions; (c) expedite the implementation of the SSR 
programme with quick-win projects focused on the armed forces, the police and the 
judiciary, and inclusive of the civil society; (d) fight effectively against impunity, organised 
crime and drug trafficking; and (e) maintain the unity of action of international partners and 
put pressure on potential spoilers in the political and military leadership to prevent a 
repetition of cycles of violence and instability. 
 
The decision, earlier this month, of the EU leadership, to engage in political consultations 
with the authorities of Guinea-Bissau, consistent with Article 96 of the Cotonou 
Agreement, could serve this purpose if exploited in a positive manner. The authorities of 
Guinea-Bissau are offered a unique opportunity to clean their records and reverse the 
negative effects of the 1 April events, by entering in a frank and direct dialogue with their 
EU counterparts, and possibly re-engage their support for long-awaited reforms in the 
country at the end of the process. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
From the EU and UN perspective, I believe it is high time to identify, within Guinea-
Bissau, those partners who could genuinely contribute to the reform of the State. In this 
regard, it is crucial to recognise that the status quo benefits those who should actually be 














Therefore, the main question is: do we benefit from maintaining a firm stance, without 
engaging in constructive dialogue and trying to sustain progress where and when 
possible? This question raises the issue of the right balance between the carrot and the 
stick, and the necessary recourse to pragmatism. 
 
It is important to keep in mind that, if not addressed in earnest, the challenges facing 
Guinea-Bissau today could have a spill-over effect on other countries in the sub-region, 
considering the scourge of drug trafficking and organised crime. This danger also affects 
countries that have recently successfully embraced democracy but remain very fragile 
institutionally speaking, such as Guinea (Conakry). 
 
Within the country itself, we need to ask ourselves and the leadership of Guinea-Bissau, 
how long can the reforms be delayed without causing trouble to society? More so when 
the age pyramid of the armed forces, police institutions and other administrations are 
reversed compared with the proportion of youth in the population. 
 
Over a decade, and given the combination of lack of political will in the country and the 
international partners’ legitimate fatigue, this country, if left to its own fate, risks coming 
under the growing influence of international drug lords, given its inability to discipline the 
armed forces and security institutions and to establish the rule of law. 
 
We may still prevent such a transformation scenario and reduce the risk of the country 
turning into a haven for terrorist groups, given the emerging inter-linkage with drug 
trafficking and organised crime. It is therefore critical to address the main challenges that 
the country is facing, including the weakness of the civilian institutions, the absence of a 
republican army, the un-finished transformation of a liberation movement into a republican 
system, the lack of constitutional clarity between key State institutions and the absence of 
the rule of law and security and their impact on major reforms, including SSR. 
 
Despite this negative picture, it is my firm belief that Guinea-Bissau has reached a 
crossroads, a turning point, and that the country has a real opportunity to address state-
building priorities in an integrated and holistic manner, provided that the national actors 
continue to demonstrate their willingness to advance on the reforms agenda in the country 
and that international partners continue to enhance their support for building credible and 
reliable republican institutions. The onus is now on the Government and armed forces of 
Guinea-Bissau to demonstrate their firm commitment to address the key challenges and 
obstacles that are hampering the long-term prospects for stability and state-building 
priorities in their country. In parallel, it is our obligation, as the international community, to 
assist in steering the country along the path to the consolidation of stability. It is in the 
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